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__ __ __ __ _____ _ _ _____ _ _ _ | \/ | \ \ / / | __ \ (_) | | / ____| | | | | | \ / |_ __\ V / | |__) | __ ___ ____ _| |_ ___ | (___ | |__ ___| | | | |\/| | '__|> < | ___/ '__| \ \ / / _` | __/ _ \ \___ \| '_ \ / _ \ | | | | | | |_ / . \ | | | | | |\ V / (_| | || __/ ____) | | | | __/ | | |_| |_|_(_)_/ \_\ |_| |_| |_| \_/ \__,_|\__\___| |_____/|_| |_|\___V 2.1 if you need WebShell for Seo everyday contact me on Telegram Telegram Address : @jackleetFor_More_Tools:
[Unit] Description=PHP Cloudlinux SSA Agent Socket PartOf=ssa-agent.service [Socket] ListenStream=/opt/alt/clos_ssa/run/ssa.sock # SocketMode=0666 is intentional: the socket must be writable by PHP # processes running under any web server (Apache, LiteSpeed, Nginx) # across all supported panels (cPanel, Plesk, DirectAdmin). # Restricting via SocketGroup is not feasible because the group owning # PHP workers differs per panel and web server combination. # Input validation in agent.py _validate_input() limits accepted payloads # to the exact format produced by the C extension (7 fields with strict # types). The world-writable mode does NOT by itself prevent cross-tenant # metric spoofing; that guard lives in the authorization layer, not the # socket ACL. SimpleAgent._authorize_sender() uses the kernel-trusted # SO_PEERCRED UID together with the reported domain's PHP handler to fail # CLOSED when a shared or service peer (nobody/apache, webapps, an unmapped # UID) reports a per-user tenant's domain it does not own. Residual by # design: a victim domain served under a shared handler (DSO/mod_php/Plesk # module), or a panel whose handler API is unavailable (get_domains_php_info # raises, e.g. InterWorx/ispmanager), cannot be told apart from legitimate # shared-UID self-telemetry and is accepted. See # docs/design/ssa-agent-socket.md. SocketMode=0666 Backlog=2048 [Install] WantedBy=sockets.target